This document is meant to outline METH's goals, how it works and invariants that are expected to hold over time to allow for security researchers to more easily dive in and assess the security of the contract and uncover vulnerabilities.

• Solvency: sum(METH balances) <= METH ETH balance (totalSupply)

• total ETH in circulation (in wei) < 2^128

This section presents a list of non-critical issues, if any of the mentioned issues could be exploited to steal the funds of others, accounts or have a user lose their own funds while using the contract correctly according to existing standards may still be elevated.

• No minimum calldatasize: The METH contract does not enforce a minimum calldatasize meaning calldata is implicitly padded with zeros at the end. Incorrect use may therefore lead to a loss if the caller e.g. calls the transfer, transferFrom, withdrawFrom, withdrawFromTo with an address that's only left padded but does not ensure it's right padded, directly concatenating the other parameters, leading the amount for the calls to be effectively left shifted.
• No recipient sanity checks: The METH contract does not check whether the recipient is the contract itself or the zero address, there's a
• No address dirty bit checks: It is not checked whether the upper bits of an address are dirty, for code sections where that may be relevant (address used to determine storage slot, event params) the address is masked to clear those bits but the contract will not revert if the upper bits are dirty, unlike Solidity.

The storage slot used to store the nonce and ERC20 balance of an account is their 20-byte address (zero-padded). Storage slots to store allowances are determined by hashing together the owner and spender addresses (keccak256(abi.encode(owner, spender))). This means that an allowance slot can be a valid balance slot if it has 12 leading zero bytes, only requiring you to bruteforce 96-bits rather than typical 128-bits required for a normal storage layout slot collision (256/2 because of birthday attack).

Finding such a collision would allow a user to arbitrarily set the balance (and permit nonce) of a non-existent account by calling approve(magic_address, desired_balance). This would be a soft violation of the solvency invariant as the sum of balances would no longer equal be below or equal to the contract's reported totalSupply. This is only a "soft" break because any balance would be unspendable without the ability to either determine the private key or deploy a contract at the desired address. Such a collision would also the attacker to irreverisbly burn METH tokens by sending them to the found address and using approve to set the balance to 0.

Finding a useable collision would require (by my understanding) similar effort (128-bits) as collisions for other contracts, because you'd need an accessible allowance slot to collide (256-bits) with a known address, zero-padded (also 256-bits), which can be

• Useable slot collision feasbility