coraza.conf-recommended

# -- Rule engine initialization ----------------------------------------------

# Enable Coraza, attaching it to every transaction. Use detection
# only to start with, because that minimises the chances of post-installation
# disruption.
#
SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly


# -- Request body handling ---------------------------------------------------

# Allow Coraza to access request bodies. If you don't, Coraza
# won't be able to see any POST parameters, which opens a large security
# hole for attackers to exploit.
#
SecRequestBodyAccess On

# Enable XML request body parser.
# Initiate XML Processor in case of xml content-type
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^(?:application(?:/soap\+|/)|text/)xml" \
     "id:'200000',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=XML"

# Enable JSON request body parser.
# Initiate JSON Processor in case of JSON content-type; change accordingly
# if your application does not use 'application/json'
#
SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^application/json" \
     "id:'200001',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"

# Sample rule to enable JSON request body parser for more subtypes.
# Uncomment or adapt this rule if you want to engage the JSON
# Processor for "+json" subtypes
#
#SecRule REQUEST_HEADERS:Content-Type "^application/[a-z0-9.-]+[+]json" \
#     "id:'200006',phase:1,t:none,t:lowercase,pass,nolog,ctl:requestBodyProcessor=JSON"

# Maximum request body size we will accept for buffering. If you support
# file uploads then the value given on the first line has to be as large
# as the largest file you are willing to accept. The second value refers
# to the size of data, with files excluded. You want to keep that value as
# low as practical.
#
SecRequestBodyLimit 13107200
SecRequestBodyNoFilesLimit 131072

# What to do if the request body size is above our configured limit.
# Keep in mind that this setting will automatically be set to ProcessPartial
# when SecRuleEngine is set to DetectionOnly mode in order to minimize
# disruptions when initially deploying Coraza.
#
SecRequestBodyLimitAction Reject

# Verify that we've correctly processed the request body.
# As a rule of thumb, when failing to process a request body
# you should reject the request (when deployed in blocking mode)
# or log a high-severity alert (when deployed in detection-only mode).
#
SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:'200002', phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Failed to parse request body.',logdata:'%{reqbody_error_msg}',severity:2"

# By default be strict with what we accept in the multipart/form-data
# request body. If the rule below proves to be too strict for your
# environment consider changing it to detection-only. You are encouraged
# _not_ to remove it altogether.
#
SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \
"id:'200003',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400, \
msg:'Multipart request body failed strict validation: \
PE %{REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR}, \
BQ %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_QUOTED}, \
BW %{MULTIPART_BOUNDARY_WHITESPACE}, \
DB %{MULTIPART_DATA_BEFORE}, \
DA %{MULTIPART_DATA_AFTER}, \
HF %{MULTIPART_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
LF %{MULTIPART_LF_LINE}, \
SM %{MULTIPART_MISSING_SEMICOLON}, \
IQ %{MULTIPART_INVALID_QUOTING}, \
IP %{MULTIPART_INVALID_PART}, \
IH %{MULTIPART_INVALID_HEADER_FOLDING}, \
FL %{MULTIPART_FILE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED}'"

# Did we see anything that might be a boundary?
#
# Here is a short description about the Coraza Multipart parser: the
# parser returns with value 0, if all "boundary-like" line matches with
# the boundary string which given in MIME header. In any other cases it returns
# with different value, eg. 1 or 2.
#
# The RFC 1341 descript the multipart content-type and its syntax must contains
# only three mandatory lines (above the content):
# * Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=BOUNDARY_STRING
# * --BOUNDARY_STRING
# * --BOUNDARY_STRING--
#
# First line indicates, that this is a multipart content, second shows that
# here starts a part of the multipart content, third shows the end of content.
#
# If there are any other lines, which starts with "--", then it should be
# another boundary id - or not.
#
# After 3.0.3, there are two kinds of types of boundary errors: strict and permissive.
#
# If multipart content contains the three necessary lines with correct order, but
# there are one or more lines with "--", then parser returns with value 2 (non-zero).
#
# If some of the necessary lines (usually the start or end) misses, or the order
# is wrong, then parser returns with value 1 (also a non-zero).
#
# You can choose, which one is what you need. The example below contains the
# 'strict' mode, which means if there are any lines with start of "--", then
# Coraza blocked the content. But the next, commented example contains
# the 'permissive' mode, then you check only if the necessary lines exists in
# correct order. Whit this, you can enable to upload PEM files (eg "----BEGIN.."),
# or other text files, which contains eg. HTTP headers.
#
# The difference is only the operator - in strict mode (first) the content blocked
# in case of any non-zero value. In permissive mode (second, commented) the
# content blocked only if the value is explicit 1. If it 0 or 2, the content will
# allowed.
#

#
# See #1747 and #1924 for further information on the possible values for
# MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY.
#
SecRule MULTIPART_UNMATCHED_BOUNDARY "@eq 1" \
    "id:'200004',phase:2,t:none,log,deny,msg:'Multipart parser detected a possible unmatched boundary.'"

# Some internal errors will set flags in TX and we will need to look for these.
# All of these are prefixed with "MSC_".  The following flags currently exist:
#
# COR_PCRE_LIMITS_EXCEEDED: PCRE match limits were exceeded.
#
SecRule TX:/^COR_/ "!@streq 0" \
        "id:'200005',phase:2,t:none,deny,msg:'Coraza internal error flagged: %{MATCHED_VAR_NAME}'"


# -- Response body handling --------------------------------------------------

# Allow Coraza to access response bodies. 
# You should have this directive enabled in order to identify errors
# and data leakage issues.
# 
# Do keep in mind that enabling this directive does increases both
# memory consumption and response latency.
#
SecResponseBodyAccess On

# Which response MIME types do you want to inspect? You should adjust the
# configuration below to catch documents but avoid static files
# (e.g., images and archives).
#
SecResponseBodyMimeType text/plain text/html text/xml

# Buffer response bodies of up to 512 KB in length.
SecResponseBodyLimit 524288

# What happens when we encounter a response body larger than the configured
# limit? By default, we process what we have and let the rest through.
# That's somewhat less secure, but does not break any legitimate pages.
#
SecResponseBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial


# -- Filesystem configuration ------------------------------------------------

# The location where Coraza stores temporary files (for example, when
# it needs to handle a file upload that is larger than the configured limit).
# 
# This default setting is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however, 
# this is less than ideal. It is recommended that you specify a location that's private.
#
SecTmpDir /tmp/

# The location where Coraza will keep its persistent data.  This default setting 
# is chosen due to all systems have /tmp available however, it
# too should be updated to a place that other users can't access.
#
SecDataDir /tmp/


# -- File uploads handling configuration -------------------------------------

# The location where Coraza stores intercepted uploaded files. This
# location must be private to Coraza. You don't want other users on
# the server to access the files, do you?
#
#SecUploadDir /opt/coraza/var/upload/

# By default, only keep the files that were determined to be unusual
# in some way (by an external inspection script). For this to work you
# will also need at least one file inspection rule.
#
#SecUploadKeepFiles RelevantOnly

# Uploaded files are by default created with permissions that do not allow
# any other user to access them. You may need to relax that if you want to
# interface Coraza to an external program (e.g., an anti-virus).
#
#SecUploadFileMode 0600


# -- Debug log configuration -------------------------------------------------

# Default debug log path
# Debug levels:
# 1: fatal
# 2: panic
# 3: error
# 4: warn
# 5: info
# 6: debug
# Most logging has not been implemented because it will be replaced with
# advanced rule profiling options
#SecDebugLog /opt/coraza/var/log/debug.log
#SecDebugLogLevel 3


# -- Audit log configuration -------------------------------------------------

# Log the transactions that are marked by a rule, as well as those that
# trigger a server error (determined by a 5xx or 4xx, excluding 404,  
# level response status codes).
#
SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly
SecAuditLogRelevantStatus "^(?:(5|4)(0|1)[0-9])$"

# Log everything we know about a transaction.
SecAuditLogParts ABIJDEFHZ

# Use a single file for logging. This is much easier to look at, but
# assumes that you will use the audit log only occasionally.
#
SecAuditLogType Serial


# -- Miscellaneous -----------------------------------------------------------

# Use the most commonly used application/x-www-form-urlencoded parameter
# separator. There's probably only one application somewhere that uses
# something else so don't expect to change this value.
#
SecArgumentSeparator &

# Settle on version 0 (zero) cookies, as that is what most applications
# use. Using an incorrect cookie version may open your installation to
# evasion attacks (against the rules that examine named cookies).
#
SecCookieFormat 0